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In this essay, I will draw upon law and society theories to discuss how 
laws regulating women’s rights in India are shaped and effected 
through societal processes. In particular, I will present the ongoing 
debate in India about the ambiguous role of state laws in advancing or 
hampering women’s rights. I will enrich this point by discussing the 
rough path of the Indian legislation against dowry and the theoretical 
and factual problems lying behind it. 
More broadly, I will also unpack the aetiological discourse about 
gender subordination in India, analysing which factors may come into 
play in bringing about gender violence and oppression. Since "tradi-
tion" is often used as scapegoat to account for episodes of violence in 
Global South contexts, I will borrow analytical lenses from history, 
legal theory and economics to suggest that oppressive patriarchal 
mechanisms may have developed along a multiplicity of different lines. 
I will theoretically frame this point by drawing on postcolonial feminist 
analyses and the concepts of positionality and intersectionality. This 
allows me to provide inputs to complicate discourses about gender in 
India and to reconsider the influence of colonisation, law and the con-
temporary state in fostering inequalities. 
Postcolonial feminism: the theoretical background 
Following the gruesome rape of Jyoti Singh by six men on a Delhi bus 
and the subsequent death of the girl due to the wounds received, 
several protests burst out all over India.1 A controversial contribution 
to the debate was provided by Leslee Udwin, who filmed the well-
known documentary India’s Daughter (2015) to report the facts of 
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Jyoti’s death. The film deeply divided the national and international 
public opinion, triggering episodes of resentment and public demonisa-
tion of Indian culture and Indian men.2 According to some intellectuals 
and activists, the documentary was in fact strongly oriented towards 
conveying a blatantly backward image of India, depicting Indian men 
as part of a savage, indefinite "rape culture" without historical or socio-
economic explanatory context. 
Kavita Krishnan, Secretary of the All India Progressive Women’s As-
sociation, deplored the conceptual premises on which the film was ba-
sed. She argued that the documentary was not only harmful to femi-
nist campaigns in India, but also racist since it implicitly profiled rape 
as a specifically Indian problem. Further, she stressed the validity of 
the ban imposed by the Indian government on the broadcasting of the 
movie, which she considered violative of the offenders’ procedural 
rights. In contrast, other feminist scholars argued that any ban on the 
film would merely support conservative attitudes about gender and 
sexuality, which rather needed to be challenged and discussed. Accor-
ding to them, Indians have to have "their own reactions and responses 
to the film—to like it, to hate it and to criticise it—rather than being fed 
vicariously the views and opinions of those who have seen it and have 
the right to see it."3 
In spite of these debates, most feminists stand united in deploring 
the authoritarian stance taken by state institutions which have subordi-
nated women’s rights to security discourses, by either stressing the 
need for harsher penalties and closer CCTV surveillance or advising 
women not to roam alone at night.4 According to several feminist scho-
lars, this caused the focus to shift from protecting the rights of women 
to live without fear to sexual surveillance and stricter law and order, 
diverting attention from the social and educational factors lying behind 
violence and the responsibility of the state in fostering an unsafe envi-
ronment for women.5 The domestic analysis of women’s issues in India 
runs therefore the risk of being limited and tied to securitarian or 
Western, ill-informed arguments that stop short of grasping the com-
plexities that imbue women’s lives in India. 
In a recent article published in The Guardian, Priyamvada Gopal 
stresses the systemic and universal nature of sexual violence, and 
more broadly gender violence, which may take different shapes accor-
ding to the contexts in which it develops. Social, economic and histo-
rical factors can mingle with patriarchal dynamics to create specific 
sets of inextricable oppressions occurring simultaneously to the same 
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individual, so-called multiple interlocking oppressions, and shape 
multidimensional and complex social identities ("intersectionality"). As 
Gopal underlines, rape can be a modern weapon mingling with other 
systems of oppression and privilege. In the Indian context, it can be 
closely connected to caste abuses, religious fanaticism and the econo-
mic inequalities brought about by aggressive capitalist policies.6 Given 
this complex interplay of factors, reducing rape and violence against 
women in South Asia to a generic Indian cultural illness therefore does 
not do justice to victims of violence. 
Postcolonial feminist analyses accuse Western feminism of having 
carried out a white, middle-class colonisation of gender issues, igno-
ring racial, cultural and historical specificities marking the condition of 
non-Western women. These differences have been erased in the Wes-
tern feminist analysis, in favour of a supposed "universal sisterhood"7, 
with the consequence of imposing models of White feminism on Global 
South contexts. These models are put forward as universal antidotes 
against gender oppression. This approach meets the wider goals of the 
so-called gender essentialist theories, according to which certain natu-
ral, biological or psychological features are attributed to women, as if 
they were fixed and universal. Hence, there arises the assumption that 
tools and discourses which may be valid for one group of women are 
valid for every woman.  
Feminist postcolonial analyses provide critical challenges to explana-
tions and systems of knowledge about women’s subordination shaped 
by liberal and Western feminist positions, particularly those which have 
occupied the international human rights arena (Kapur 2005: 4).8 Like-
wise, postcolonial feminism warns against the move of integrating cul-
tural diversity to offset gender essentialism. The risk inherent in this 
approach, labelled as "cultural essentialism", is to reinforce a view of 
the "other" as backward and uncivilised and of the developing world 
woman as tradition-bound, poor and illiterate (ibid.: 115). 
When discussing the Orientalist construction of knowledge about 
women on the part of British colonisers, Chandra Mohanty draws 
attention to the so-called "colonialist move" which consisted in outli-
ning the "Third World woman" as a singular and monolithic subject 
(Mohanty, C. cit. in Tyagi 2014: 48). This set up false homogeneity 
which still informs several discourses and serves to obscure "the histo-
rically specific material reality of groups of women" (Mohanty, C. cit. in 
Cossman & Kapur 1993: 283). Further, they were described as helpless 
individuals in need of being rescued from backward and barbarous 
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social practices (Carby, H. cit. in Tyagi 2014: 47), an attitude that 
often recurs in some parts of Western feminist literature and which is, 
according to the Italian philosopher Valeria Ottonelli, a form of violence 
in itself. She identifies the risk inherent in claiming freedom on behalf 
of third parties, stressing that  
violence begins at the very moment in which one substitutes 
one’s own voice for another’s to ask for her emancipation and, as 
a first step, depicts her as being "non-free". Emancipation claims 
on behalf of third parties are violent and harmful since saying to 
somebody or about somebody that she is not free amounts ipso 
facto to diminishing her agency. (2013: 112; author’s translation) 
Another target of criticism is the adoption, on the part of Western and 
liberal feminism, of inadequate, limited dichotomies and a universal 
binary notion of patriarchy (men vs. women, oppressors vs. oppress-
sed) which overlooks more complex relations (Mohanty, C. cit. in Tyagi 
2014: 49). The need to further elaborate on the sides of both oppress-
sors and oppressed implies considering as potential agents of violence 
also women who might decide to exploit power hierarchies within the 
household and engage in what Deniz Kandiyoti calls "patriarchal bar-
gaining" (Kandiyoti, D. cit. in Reddy 2014: 33). Female subordination 
to men is offset by the control they attain as older women over youn-
ger women, negotiating their space and privileges in the family to the 
detriment of more vulnerable subjects.9 
The Verma Committee Report, submitted to the government one 
month after Jyoti’s death to recommend amendments to the existing 
laws on rape, stresses the role of the so-called "culture of replication 
and consensus" in perpetuating violence and patriarchy. According to 
this concept of replication and consensus, some practices, having been 
normalised in a society, are accepted and then replicated by women on 
their children.10  
Indeed, some studies show that between 33 and 40 per cent of vio-
lent domestic acts in India are perpetrated by the extended family, 
including presumably older women (Gangoli & Rew 2011: 421). In light 
of this data, Indian feminists came to recognise the nature of female 
violence against women as a part of Indian social structures. None-
theless, it is an analytical mistake to pursue a complete feminisation of 
violence, placing all the responsibility on women and obfuscating men’s 
role in perpetrating violence, as well as to reiterate the misogynist rhe-
toric that "women are women’s worst enemies" (Gangoli 2007: 106). 
One way of making sense of this data is to acknowledge that women 
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may be compelled to follow certain behaviours, due to power imbalan-
ces and patriarchal rules existing within the family. However, one 
should be careful not to completely erase the role and agency of wo-
men from the analysis as this would be tantamount to fall in the very 
same binary trap "men vs. women" that postcolonial feminism has 
tried to defy. Thinking that women can only be victims of events and 
never agents or accomplices contributes to perpetuating an image 
(which has a very colonial flavour) of women as passive, weak creatu-
res with no will of their own. 
In light of these considerations, it appears that the classic analytical 
dichotomy of patriarchy as an issue of "men vs. women" is deeply 
inadequate and does not capture more nuanced and complex situa-
tions. There is therefore a strong need of doing away with oversimpli-
fied categorisations in favour of carrying out a positional analysis which 
takes due account of the specificities and positions of both the nar-
rator11 and the narrated subjects, refraining from polarised stances. 
Death by culture? 
Indeed, when it comes to violence against women in developing coun-
tries, and particularly in South Asia, it often happens that violent epi-
sodes are gathered underneath the umbrella term of "cultural crimes", 
grounding the reasoning on the assumption of culture as something 
fixed, homogenous and easily identifiable. Culture, which in some 
scholarship is often used as a synonym for tradition, is frequently 
employed to explain the kind of violence experienced by women in the 
developing world, though it is not invoked in a similar way when dis-
cussing violence against women in various Western contexts (Kapur 
2005: 110). Indeed, some scholars underline that what in the Western 
world might be labelled as "sexual jealousy", "crime of passion", etc. 
seems not to be happening in India, or happening in a culturally deter-
mined way.12 
Aisha Gill, in laying bare the narrative adopted by the British media 
when reporting honour-based episodes of violence, points to the fact 
that "mainstream" forms of domestic violence are generally reported 
as individual deviations and aberrations. In contrast, the majority of 
news stories about honour-based violence employ arguments of 
cultural differences to account for these episodes of violence. Dysfunc-
tional family dynamics, which are often a factor, are repeatedly 
neglected in these accounts (Gill 2014: 188). Gill maintains that this 
discursive strategy brings about a distorted perception of these pheno-
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mena to such an extent that forms of violence presented as culturally 
specific come to be perceived as more abhorrent than "normal" 
("white") domestic violence. In the eyes of observers, this can make 
phenomena like honour killings seem more comfortably intelligible, 
preserving at the same time their foreignness (Narayan, U. cit. in Gill 
2014:193). 
The analysis of allegedly traditional forms of discrimination and vio-
lence should be inflected with a broader understanding of culture, as 
something encompassing the whole spectrum of experiences and 
modes of thinking, feeling and behaving—as well as the values, cus-
toms and traditions—of relevant social formations (Gill 2014: 188). 
Historical and economic factors impinging on social behaviours should 
be also considered in order to carry out a comprehensive analysis. 
The impact of colonialism on the social and legal position of 
women 
A thorough investigation into the genealogy of gender issues in India 
cannot avoid further exposing the impact of British colonisation and 
the Orientalist construction of knowledge about native women on con-
temporary approaches and considerations. This inquiry may be useful 
to supersede standard explanations of women’s issues in India and 
engage in more fruitful debates and policy-making. 
In discussing colonialist theories, Lata Mani points out that "tradition 
was not the ground on which the status of women was being con-
tested. Rather the reverse was true […] what was at stake was not 
women but tradition" (Mani, L. cit. in Arya 2012: 54). The colonial 
power sought to bolster its legitimacy through a critique of indigenous 
law and society, and women’s bodies and lives not only became a 
battle field where to struggle for mastery (Sen 2001: 7) and social 
control, but were also instrumental in building the image of the huma-
nitarian Western saviours as opposed to barbarous Hindu men 
(Sturman 2010: 101). 
Indrani Sen contends that the colonisers’ strategy was rather com-
plex and took advantage of a tailor-made Orientalist discourse meant 
to discredit Hindu males, often depicted as decadent and lascivious 
(Sen 2001: 10).13 By contrast, women, who were already seen as pas-
sive and defenceless, were further described as victims of an illogical 
and sexually perverse culture and in need of the British civilising inter-
vention (Arya 2012: 53). This gender essentialist approach, merged 
with cultural assumptions and prejudices, brought about the concep-
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tual and social marginalisation of women, who came to be considered 
as weak and unable to resist tradition or choose the direction of their 
life. 
This deviated and deviating image of the Indian man was but one of 
the effects of the colonial construction of the Indian space (Chitnis & 
Wright 2007: 1345) and allowed the colonisers to justify their action as 
a "civilising mission" and to adopt a paradigm which would enable 
them to affirm their moral superiority over the natives. Indian society 
was depicted as unfit to rule itself and as morally inferior to the "hy-
permasculine" West, which indirectly proclaimed itself as the only enti-
ty able to rule the colonised territory and population (Moore 1998: 27). 
It has been argued that this "naturalisation" and "essentialisation" of 
difference therefore served the purpose of denying both a wide range 
of legal rights and sovereignty to the colonised (Kapur 2006a: 678).14  
This situation triggered an equally dangerous reaction on the part of 
the Hindu nationalist movement, which, in an attempt to save native 
culture and customs from criticism and undue European interference, 
reconstituted in its discourses the "home" as a pure space of Hindu 
culture, uncontaminated by the colonial encounter (Kapur 2005: 53). 
The home had to be protected from the corrupting influence of the 
West through women, using their virtues of "chastity, self-sacrifice, 
submission, devotion, kindness, patience and the labours of love" 
(Chatterjee, P. cit. in Kapur 2005: 53). Chatterjee links this nationalist 
idea of the woman to the absence of social gender reforms at the end 
of the nineteenth century: because of these considerations, nationa-
lists refused to engage in negotiations and discussions on the question 
of women with the colonial power, thus impeding any further eman-
cipation. This reinforces Lata Mani’s argument that women’s bodies 
served as a pretext as well as a primary site for re-articulation of 
power, tradition and culture. 
Furthermore, it has been observed that the stances adopted by 
nationalist movements contributed to the intensification of the theore-
tical and social divide between public and private spaces (Kapur 2005: 
29). This divide still informs several governmental policies and the 
breaking down of this separateness has long represented one of the 
main projects of various feminist movements, campaigning for the 
penetration of questions of justice into every domain of human life, 
including the family.15 Indeed, the "doctrine of space" was used in the 
colonial period and has been used recently to argue that domestic 
affairs should be confined to the private space of family and that all 
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matters within the family should be kept out of the purview of the law. 
Some scholars have claimed that one of the direct consequences of 
this approach is to consider some forms of sexuality as legitimate as 
long as they are exercised within the family (ibid.: 32): think of marital 
rape, which was excluded from the 2013 criminal law amendment and 
kept in place as a blatant exception to section 375of the Indian Penal 
Code disciplining rape.16 This has been regarded by some authors as 
reinforcing patterns of heterosexual dominance within marriage, where 
women can legitimately be the sexual property of their husbands 
(Gangoli 2007: 58). 
The British repeatedly showed their intention not to interfere with 
matters related to the personal sphere, but it appears that they actu-
ally exerted direct and indirect influence in this field. Their official aim 
was to bring civilisation and progress to the local system, eradicating 
ancient "savage" practices. But if one takes a closer look at some of 
the laws enacted by the British, it can be noted how, "most ostensibly 
for the uplifting of women", they were in fact "deliberately designed to 
be limited in scope" (Tambe 2000: 590).17 Not only were these laws 
conservative in nature, but they also realised a sort of collusion 
between different kinds of patriarchies. Furthermore, according to 
some scholars, by rendering scriptural interpretations and formal opi-
nions within the ambit of personal laws, the British eroded certain cus-
tomary ambiguities on which female negotiating power had hinged in 
the private realm (Agnes 1999: 58). 
In light of these observations, we can argue that the British contri-
buted to the perpetuation and, somewhat, the stiffening of certain pa-
triarchal mechanisms, with the indirect support of the nationalist 
movement. Despite their overt declarations, the colonisers adopted a 
substantially conservative approach which added to the subordinate 
position of women in society both from a legal and social perspective, 
depicting them as passive individuals in need of protection and legally 
marginalising them, leaving little room for self-determination and 
negotiation. 
Mainstream feminist positions have been criticised for their alleged 
complicity with the colonial project18 because they have not adequately 
addressed how this cumbersome colonial past continues to inform 
postcolonial realities, oppressive gender relationships and the under-
standing of differences. 
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The role of the state in perpetuating gender discrimination:  
"Institutional Violence" 
Having stressed the fact that violence against women in South Asia 
does not merely stem from cultural and religious premises, but can be 
rooted in Western patterns of domination and local reactions to it, I will 
now develop a third point which will be more closely related to the res-
ponsibility of the state in addressing violence and legal pluralism. 
The Mexican anthropologist Marcela Lagarde, in theorising a broader 
concept of feminicide, drew attention to so-called "institutional" or 
"systemic violence" to describe the kind of violence stemming from the 
inability or unwillingness on the part of the state to confront forms of 
gender violence or from its direct involvement in perpetrating it 
(Spinelli 2008: 44-5).19 According to the doctrine of "due diligence", 
which was developed within the framework of the General Recommen-
dation No. 19 adopted in 1992 by the United Nations Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), states 
become responsible for private acts, "if they fail to act with due dili-
gence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts 
of violence, and for providing compensation" (CEDAW Women 1992: 
comment 9). CEDAW further recommended the adoption of measures 
meant to safeguard women’s rights; namely, states must ensure effec-
tive preventive measures (education and public information program-
mes intended to deconstruct crystallised gender roles (ibid.: recom-
mendation 24 (f)), protective measures (such as services for victims of 
family violence, rape, sexual assaults and other forms of gender-based 
violence, including shelters, specially trained health workers, rehabili-
tation and counselling (ibid.: recommendation 24(k)) and legal mea-
sures.20 
As to the latter, Radhika Coomaraswamy (2010: 10) asserts that if 
one can demonstrate that the application of a specific set of laws gene-
rates discrimination against victims of violence, then the state can be 
held responsible for the violation of equality and non-discrimination 
principles under international human rights law. In order to avoid this, 
states should, as a first step, refrain from any discriminatory practice, 
making sure that the same be done by authorities and public insti-
tutions, and secondly check the national legislation repealing laws and 
rules which are discriminatory in nature. 
The Indian case is particularly interesting as there are several pro-
visions still in place which would hardly pass this "non-discrimination 
test." In addition to Exception 2 to s. 375 of the Indian Penal Code 
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(the exclusion of marital rape), s. 377 of the same code, rubricated as 
"unnatural offences", criminalises sodomy, basically targeting homose-
xual relationships. It is nonetheless possible to see a glimmer of light 
after the Indian Supreme Court’s decision (2 February 2016) to hear in 
open court curative petitions on this section, opening the doors for a 
rectification of previous conservative judgements. Finally, it should be 
noted that s. 155 of the Indian Evidence Act, "Impeaching credit of a 
witness", was in effect until 2002, when it was ultimately repealed. 
This section allowed the accused to discredit the testimony of his pro-
secutrix in a rape case by making reference to her personal sexual his-
tory: "[…] it may be shown that the prosecutrix was of generally 
immoral character."  
Nonetheless, as Simone de Beauvoir stated, recognising abstract 
rights has never been enough to assure women of a definite hold on 
the world (De Beauvoir, S. cit. in Sunder Rajan 2003: 18). Over the 
years, several campaigns for human rights have forced the Indian sta-
te to enact new legislation, sponsor reports and set up commissions to 
meet national and international pressures. Still, despite these legal 
achievements and the proliferation of laws meant to protect women’s 
rights, an enormous gap exists between formal equality and subs-
tantial inequality. Many of these laws remain inaccessible to the vast 
majority of Indian women (Cossman & Kapur 1993: 289), bringing 
about little or no improvement in their status. As Kapur points out, 
"the gap between formal rights and the actual status of disadvantaged 
groups has not decreased as a result of the legalization process" 
(2006b: 101). 
More sceptical feminists, looking at the shortcomings of the hyper 
legislative experience of the 1980s and 1990s, raised doubts about the 
transformative capacity of law and its ability to bring about effective 
social change (Gangoli 2007: 9). The Indian state’s failure in adequa-
tely addressing women’s issues has divided feminist movements on the 
issue of seeking the state’s support in pursuing liberation and equality. 
On the grounds of postmodernist and Foucauldian theories of states 
and law, radical and communitarian feminists maintain that liberal faith 
in the state’s promises is no longer valid as an attitude. In their opi-
nion, continued law reform is a waste of energy, as well as against the 
interests of women (Sunder Rajan 2003: 31)21, and they envisage 
instead reforms from within communities and social institutions. Left-
liberal feminists, on the contrary, ask for rectifications and impro-
vement of existing law and more substantial equality by negotiations 
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with and within the state. They stress the beneficial role of the process 
of these struggles, rather than the ends, in raising awareness of 
women’s rights among women and among the general public (ibid.:  
32).22 
Generally, it could be said that few feminists have faith in legal solu-
tions to violence and many are wary of being co-opted by state and 
hegemonic discourses; nonetheless, law remains a significant terrain 
for feminist interventions. While at times law may reinforce oppressive 
patriarchal mechanisms, it is in fact undeniable that it is also a crucial 
means of resistance, liberation and change. The legalisation process 
can be used as a very radical tool by the invisible and marginalised 
people to put forward their requests, forge their political identity and 
challenge dominant social meanings (Kapur 2006b: 110). In this 
regard, law is vested with a critical normative and constitutive role, in 
that it has the power to legitimise "certain visions of the social order, 
to determine relations between persons and groups and to manipulate 
cultural understandings and discourses" (Moore 1998: 35). This view is 
closely linked with postmodernist constructions of knowledge as a par-
tial product of perspectives. The Enlightenment description of the indi-
vidual as a subject existing prior to its interaction with society is criti-
cised and substituted with a view of the subject as produced through a 
multiplicity of discourses (Kapur 2006b: 103). Among these discour-
ses, law is a particularly authoritative one as it has the power to defini-
tively pinpoint the boundaries and features of situations and events, 
shaping their popular understanding (Finley, L. cit. in ibid.: 104). 
In contrast to the totalising project of the state which unifies the 
people as a national community, there stands its individualising atti-
tude that constructs subjects in specific roles and ways (including law) 
(Sunder Rajan 2003: 6). The state in its governmental function is the-
refore involved in producing rather than merely controlling individuals, 
partially affecting their experiences, self-understandings and capaci-
ties.23 Not only does legal discourse constitute subjects as legal citi-
zens, but also as gendered subjects, drawing lines between men and 
women or among women themselves. Likewise, it mirrors social con-
cerns and attitudes towards women and their sexuality and, by doing 
so, helps perpetuate patriarchal arrangements. 
Nonetheless, this is but one of the problematic aspects law can pre-
sent to the advancement of women’s rights. Indeed, in addition to a 
gender essentialist approach which obscures the inner diversity among 
women and discounts the different impact laws may have on different 
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women, overemphasising the role of law in bringing about social 
change may encourage the view that "law is the exclusive language in 
which to express claims to social justice and emancipation and conse-
quently marginalize the benefits of other 'emancipatory' vocabularies" 
(Kapur 2006b: 106). Paradoxically, over legislative and overprotective 
measures on the part of the state may be more harmful than useful. 
For instance, prescribing more stringent punishments for offenders 
may cause conviction rates to fall: the National Commission of Women 
in its report Rape: a legal study (2000) opposed the introduction of the 
death penalty provision for cases of rape arguing that such an irevo-
cable penalty would reduce the already very low conviction rate 
(Sunder Rajan 2003: 242, fn. 34).  
Nonetheless, "the progression of amendments to the original anti-
dowry legislation during the 1980s may be a model lesson in criminal 
law strategies and their lack of real impact in society" (Menski 1998: 
59). This can be ascribed, among other things, to a theoretical misre-
presentation of the features of the phenomenon. In much of the rele-
vant national and international literature, dowry-related crimes are 
examined through the analytical lenses of culture and presented as 
exotic and ancient Hindu practices, pathological in nature and harmful 
to women’s dignity and integrity. Uma Narayan uses the term "death 
by culture" to point out that dowry-related murders are cast in First 
World scholarship as age-old Indian customs, and contrasts this with 
research on domestic violence murders in the US, which on the con-
trary are not presented as American cultural practices nor explained by 
making reference to the Bible (Kapur 2005: 109, fn. 11). Kapur argues 
that "[d]owry murders continue to receive attention from researchers 
because of their connection with the Other and their misplaced cultural 
association with fire which exoticises the practice" (ibid.: 111). The 
same argument is reinforced by Oldenburg who maintains that  
[b]urning rings bells in your brain. Suddenly, it's cultural–Hindu, 
fire, cremations, sati are pre-associated with it. You get the whole 
culture laid out. However, it (burning) is the simplest crime. It's a 
kitchen crime. You have a tin of kerosene, you have a match. 
When you burn a woman, you won't find any fingerprints, any 
kind of tell-tale signs of whether she died in an accident, suicide 
or murder.24 
Talwar Oldenburg labels this approach "the exoticism move" which only 
exonerates the researcher from further investigation of the issue at a 
deeper level, "by inquiring whether there are more complex stories to 
tell about dowry, and about domestic violence generally" (Talwar 
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Oldenburg, V. cit. in Kapur 2005: 112). Exoticising the object of inves-
tigation is an intellectual justification which should find no place in 
research, as it impoverishes discourses on gender and violence, fails to 
reflect on the absolutely contemporary aspects of certain phenomena 
and adds to the alleged ontological gap existing between the West and 
"the rest." Narayan argues that "the 'death by culture' arguments used 
to explain the phenomenon of dowry murders are neither accurate nor 
helpful" as they offer very little understanding about the nature and 
causes of such practices (Narayan, U. cit. in Kapur 2005: 109, fn. 11). 
Suggestions for a Broader Analysis 
The repeated failures of the state in providing effective legal responses 
to phenomena such as the ones discussed above hint at the fact that 
the complex nature of gender violence and of practices like dowry is 
often not fully grasped. 
With regards to dowry, the cornerstone of the question may lie in 
stopping treating the dowry problem as a mere legal issue, and star-
ting seeing it as a more complex social and economic matter, for which 
no matter how many amendments are enacted, they will never suc-
ceed in solving it. As Sunder Rajan acutely points out, "modern dowry 
inhabits another world than the private one of families" and in order to 
fully comprehend its identity we should dislodge the aetiological dis-
course from traditional and cultural premises and start looking, among 
other things, at the new forms of consumerism promoted by the neoli-
beral regime or the role of a status-booster it often plays in marriages 
(Sunder Rajan 2003: 205).  
First of all, researches show that, behind what is often construed as 
a dowry problem may lie different and broader conjugal problems and 
dowry can be just a pretext to oppress women25 or express dissatisfac-
tion and contempt. After an initial focus on dowry-related murders and 
bride burning, women’s movements subsequently acknowledged such 
myopia which denied "recognition and legitimacy to the need for pro-
tection against violence by all women under all circumstances" (Agnes, 
F. cit. in Gangoli 2007: 103). The boundaries between dowry-related 
issues and other problems are blurred: dowry violence is just one part 
of domestic violence, sometimes merely the tip of an iceberg, and 
complainants often resort to anti-dowry legislation simply because 
they think it is more stringent and want to ensure prosecution against 
their oppressors (Wyatt & Masood 2003: 3).26  
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Furthermore, a better contextualisation of the role of women in soci-
ety is needed in order to grasp the nature of the social and legal sphe-
res which they have to navigate, outlining the features of the relation-
ships that tie them to the outside world and how these ties shape their 
identities and rights. Reena Patel stresses the importance of "mov(ing) 
beyond positive law and the enunciation of rights within it […] to take 
account of women’s particular locations and the constitutive realities of 
their lives" (Patel 2006: 1259): adopting a legal pluralist perspective is 
therefore crucial in acknowledging that there are regulatory or norma-
tive systems other than formal law that discipline individuals’ lives. 
This approach scales down the role of state law and partly explains the 
shortcomings of several sets of law.
In order for a law to be effective, it is of paramount importance to 
research thoroughly the terrain where it will operate, engaging in a 
fruitful dialogue with these parallel normative spheres and investiga-
ting the nature of the social ties that may affect the correct functioning 
of a law. Mapping these aspects makes it possible to shape laws that 
will impact not only the symptoms of a problem, but also its causes, 
weakening those mechanisms that contribute to the subordination of 
women.  
As to dowry, many scholars stressed the desirability of ensuring 
equal inheritance rights to women as a means to curb the dowry pro-
blem. It has been argued that, by protecting daughters from unlawful 
disinheritance and granting them stronger property rights through 
inheritance laws, they would stop considering dowry the only viable 
solution to get a share in native family properties and to enter the 
groom’s family with some sort of bargaining power.  
This can partly explain the shortcomings of the dowry boycott cam-
paigns, initially led by Manushi’s founder Madhu Kishwar. She carried 
out a partial analysis of Indian women’s lives which finally badly im-
pacted the result of her programmes. She noticed that women were 
not willing to refuse dowry, despite recognising its potentially danger-
ous aspects, and this brought her to acknowledge that women often 
did not have any better option available (Kishwar 1983: 3). Kishwar 
therefore shifted the focus of her struggle towards better implemen-
tation of inheritance rights.  
With this in mind, the Parliament enacted the Hindu Succession 
(Amendment) Act, 2005 and removed the disparities previously set by 
the 1956 Act within the Hindu community. The legislation now recogni-
ses equal inheritance rights to daughters and sons in ancestral proper-
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ty, providing women with the status of coparcener with the same rights 
and responsibilities as men. Nonetheless, the test of time revealed the 
shallow nature of these legal interventions, as women rarely claim 
their rights in natal family property, often putting forward sentimental 
and ideological reasons. The fear of being labelled as greedy, selfish 
and homewreckers by claiming their rights and therefore bringing 
about the disintegration of the age old family properties can be so 
strong that women often prefer not to endanger ties with their original 
family, waiving their inheritance rights altogether. 
The persistence of dowry-related episodes of violence and, more 
broadly, of domestic violence, in spite of all the reforms enacted, sug-
gests that legal intervention is not enough and that larger-scale efforts 
should be made. Legal rights in inheritance, property and anti-dowry 
legislation are nothing but empty shells, if not coupled with corres-
ponding social power in exercising them. These laws did not substan-
tially impact the structural inequality women suffer within the family, 
but rather acted, and still do, within this familial arrangement. 
One way of enhancing women’s social power can be constantly che-
cking the activities of those who are in charge of implementing the law 
(police and judges, above all) and by securing access to justice and 
fundamental services such as education, health care and equal pay. A 
good level of education would allow women to offer skills in the labour 
market and receive better pay. A better education and better-paid 
work would also mean stronger bargaining power within the family, 
granting women not only legal independence but also factual and social 
autonomy.27 This would spare them being overburdened with house-
hold chores and open up the possibility for them to leave the hus-
band’s family promptly, should conjugal problems become unbearable 
and dangerous. 
Finally, it is important to assess the impact of recent neoliberal poli-
cies of economic deregulation, reduction of governmental controls and 
increased autonomy for private investment. Some scholars have 
argued that, if these measures may have shaped a more efficient sys-
tem of economic governance, on the other hand they have caused an 
erosion of labour rights and profits for both urban and rural poor 
(Gangoli 2007: 13). Among these poor, women appear to be paying 
the highest price for the paradoxes and failures of neoliberalism. 
According to some authors, there is much evidence of the gendered 
nature of poverty and the disproportionate burden of it on women. In 
fact, some family members can be poorer than others, due to discrimi-
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natory patriarchal practices such as the prevention of women from 
getting access to economic resources, health care and food. This often 
causes them to suffer severely and disproportionately from illnesses 
and malnutrition (Cossman & Kapur 1993: 282). 
However, we should not think that the problems brought about by 
neoliberalism concern only those groups situated at the extreme poles 
of the social ladder, since they have affected the middle-classes as 
well. It has been observed that the remarkable economic growth expe-
rienced by India in the past decade has had small impact on the gene-
ration of new jobs, inducing that phenomenon known as 'jobless 
growth', where unemployment remains high even as the economy 
grows.28 Following the shrinking of the agricultural share from 57 to 53 
per cent in the period between 2004 and 2010, 15 million workers 
migrated to towns and cities for work. The manufacturing and services 
sectors failed to absorb them fully. This is why most migrant workers 
joined the informal sector,29 where there is no legal protection and 
wages are usually on the limit of viability. These people abruptly found 
themselves caught in unstable, temporary working conditions which 
prevented them from earning a living or making long-term projects 
(Sen, S. cit. in Sirohi 2003: 16). This was coupled with a sudden avai-
lability of goods (Jeffrey 2014: 13), potentially within everyone’s 
reach, but actually inaccessible to the greater part of the population. 
Marriage, with all its corollaries like dowry and other economic exchan-
ges, has therefore become, even more than it used to be, the fastest 
track to wealth and the reasoning behind it all the more material. 
Praveen Swami, talking about violent behaviours against women, 
wittily quotes Irvine Welsh’s Marabou stock nightmares underlining 
that behaviours always have a context. He stresses the fact that, 
behind Indian men’s dysfunctional attitudes towards women, may lie 
different contexts which, combined together, affect young men’s social 
and personal development. Among these contexts, "India’s transfor-
ming urban economy has, firstly, produced a mass of young, prospect-
less men. […] The young, though, find themselves fighting for space in 
an economy that offers mainly casual work."30  
This sense of frustration and alienation from society clashed with the 
advent of different relational models between genders and the new 
role women play in society. The increase in the status and indepen-
dence of some women, their growing presence in public jobs31 and 
their assertion of personal identity and subjectivity may have deeply 
shaken the fragile equilibrium in men-women relationships, forcing a 
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reconfiguration of previous balances. These advancements in women’s 
status may have been perceived as threats to the social status quo 
(Fraschetti 2013: 11) and to the institution of traditional family, where 
men usually play the role of bread-winners.  
Gelles analyses the dynamics of domestic violence stating that 
"[v]iolence is developed in the family as it is in society by a superior 
status group (husbands) on an inferior status group (wives and chil-
dren) when the legitimacy of the superior group's status is questioned" 
(Gelles, R. J. cit. in Hirsch 1981: xxii). Hirsch builds on this point argu-
ing that this increase in the status of women may generate anxiety in 
those men that she defines as troubled by "compulsive masculinity." 
Changes in gender balances may be therefore seen by these men as a 
threat to their position of superiority (ibid.). The inability on the part of 
some men to conform to bread-winner and manhood paradigms may 
therefore bring about frustration and a sense of emasculation which 
may find a way out through violence, often to the detriment of women.  
In conclusion, dowry and marriage have increasingly served material 
strategies of easy accumulation of wealth. This aspect has been cou-
pled with an exacerbation of men-women relationship, due to aggres-
sive economic policies which allegedly left many people behind and 
new relational models between genders. This situation resulted in the 
breaking down of manhood paradigms and, following Gelles’ reasoning, 
harsher episodes of domestic violence. As stated at the beginning of 
this section, these episodes are often hidden behind dowry justifica-
tions, but their nature is far more complex, with dowry representing 
only one facet of the whole. I therefore argue that any analysis on 
dowry and dowry legislation effects should always be mindful of these 
factors. 
Conclusions 
The first point I made is that violence against women does not merely 
originate from backward cultural practices and that seeing a clash 
between backward traditions (bad) and positivist state norms (good) 
ignores crucial shades and aspects. In light of this, the first critical 
methodological step is starting to think of culture as a dynamic, hybrid 
entity constantly reconstituting itself on the grounds of historical, 
social and economic influences.32 
The violence more and less directly perpetrated by the British colo-
nisers, who actively contributed to maintaining a patriarchal social sta-
tus quo and in some cases even reshaped tradition in a stricter sense, 
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provides suitable examples to bolster this argument. Subsequently, on 
the basis of Lagarde’s analysis, I underlined how even the state can be 
responsible for gender discrimination and institutional violence, 
through limp implementation of existing legislation or ineffective laws 
drafted without taking due account of the intensely plural realities in 
which women live. I drew upon the socio-legal analysis of dowry and 
dowry-related deaths to substantiate this argument and describe how 
wide-ranging policies should be in order for a piece of legislation to be 
effective. Social aspects such as the role of women in the society or 
the factual imbalances they have to cope with in different social arenas 
are all factors affecting the functioning of laws. Furthermore, I stressed 
the role of economically aggressive neoliberal politics in India as ele-
ments influencing the relationships between gender and the social ter-
rain where laws operate. The consequences of neoliberalism, its impact 
on the economic conditions of many people and the new role played by 
women in the society may have triggered vicious cycles and violent 
mechanisms whose high price is often paid by women. 
Sagarika Ghose, columnist at The Hindustan Times, writes that "[a] 
profound fear and a deep, almost pathological, hatred of the woman 
who aspires to be anything more than mother and wife is justified on 
the grounds of tradition."33 Debunking the myth of evil traditions, 
unpacking culture and identifying alternative roots to gender violence 
may be useful methodological tools to better grasp the reality of many 
Indian women and develop more comprehensive policies to address 
the manifold issues affecting Indian women’s lives today. 
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after watching a movie in New Delhi. She was assaulted in the private bus that she had taken to 
go back home with her friend. The girl died several days after the assault, namely on 29 Decem-
ber, at the Mount Elizabeth Hospital in Singapore because of the massive damage suffered.  
2 The Leipzig University internship controversy is a best-known example of the impact the media 
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